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Abstract  
This paper studies the CEO Pay Slice (CPS) of UK listed firms during the period 2003 to 
2009. We investigate the determinants of CPS. We study the links between CPS and measures of 
firm performance. We find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance ratings and those 
with more independent boards tend to have higher CPS. In addition, we find that CEOs are more 
likely to receive lower compensation when they chair the board and when they work in firms with 
large board size. We also find that higher CPS is positively associated with firm performance after 
controlling the firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance variables. We get compatible 
results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm performance. Our 
results remain robust to alternative accounting measures of firm performance. Our results suggest 
that high UK CPS levels do indeed reflect top managerial talent rather than managerial power. 
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1. Introduction  
Prior research has paid considerable attention to the effect of CEO characteristics on organizational 
performance. Falato et al. (2011), using reputation, career record, and educational background as 
proxies for CEO talent, document a positive effect of shareholders wealth on the appointment of  
talented CEOs, which is consistent with the argument that talented CEOs have superior ability to 
process economics information and make value-added decisions for shareholders. Chang et al. (2010) 
examine CEO departure between 1992 and 2002, and find that CEO subsequent labour market 
success is greater if the firm’s pre-departure performance is better and the prior pay is higher. This 
suggests that CEOs are compensated for their abilities with high remunerations. However, during the 
negotiation of compensation contract with the board, powerful managers may take advantage of their 
influence over the board to maximize their personal welfare (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; 
Bebchuk and Fried 2003), which implies that high compensation may reflect the power of managers 
and indeed indicates weak governance of the firm. Measuring CEO’s power with the proportion of 
the total compensation of top-five highly paid executives captured by CEO (CEO pay slice) in a 
given firm, Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CPS is associated with lower firm value and inferior 
accounting performance. Furthermore, CPS is correlated with lower stock return accompanying 
acquisition announcement and higher likelihood that CEOs receiving “lucky” option grant. 
Consistent with the managerial power hypothesis, they conclude that higher CPS is associated with 
agency problem.  
    To summarize, high CEO compensation reflected by CPS may imply that CEOs have superior 
capability or qualification, which enhances their contribution to the firm. Alternatively, high CPS can 
be explained by the managerial power approach, in that a weak corporate governance structure will 
lead to an inefficient design of compensation contracts, so powerful CEOs will take this advantage to 
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maximize their personal benefits. The competing predictions from different theories call for more 
empirical research on this topic. 
   In this study, we follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Forbes et al. (2014) and measure the relative 
importance of the CEO using CPS, and test the association between CPS and firm performance in the 
UK context.
2
 Different from Bebchuk et al. (2011), we find that higher CPS is positively associated 
with firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, after controlling for firm-specific characteristics and 
governance variables. We also report similar findings when we substitute CPS with equity-based 
CPS. Our results stay robust if we use accounting measures such as Return on Assets (ROA) and 
Return on Equity (ROE) to reflect firm performance. We suggest that CEOs of public listed firms in 
UK are compensated for their talents and capabilities, and the difference between our results and 
those of Bebchuk et al. (2011) can be explained by the different institutional backgrounds between 
US and UK. Although The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) share a similarity in 
diverse corporate ownership structures and generally high quality corporate governance (Wang and 
Hussainey 2013), recent research argues that the US and UK have very different corporate 
governance systems (Siepel and Nightingale 2014). A series of reports have been issued to 
strengthen UK governance system. For example, Cadbury report (1992) addresses the financial 
aspects of corporate governance and produces a code of best practice for publicly listed companies. 
Greenbury report (1995), which concentrates on the remuneration of directors, recommends the 
                                                          
2 In this study we use CEO pay slice instead of the CEO pay inequality measure developed by Forbes et al. (2014) for 
two reasons. First, Forbes et al. (2014) calculate a measure of CEO pay inequality as the compensation of the CEO 
divided by remuneration to all the executives on the board. This measure is inversely associated with the size of the board. 
Prior research (i.e. Guest 2009) shows that the board size is negatively associated with corporate performance using UK 
data. As a result, examining the effect of CEO pay inequality on firm performance is vulnerable to the correlated omitted 
variable problem, because CEO pay inequality and firm performance are related to board size. Second, our focus in this 
paper is to investigate the association between CEO’s relative pay and firm’s future performance, and one benefit of 
using CPS is that we may compare and reconcile our findings to those based on US data (i.e. Bebchuk et al. 2011). If we 
do not use CPS, it will be difficult to triangulate our results with previous studies. 
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establishment of remuneration committee comprising entirely of non-executive directors to decide 
the remuneration of the executive directors.
3
 Furthermore, it also recommended that long term 
incentive schemes paid by firms (including stock options) should be subject to challenging 
performance criteria. The recommendations of the Greenbury report have been subsequently taken 
on board by the London Stock Exchange and have been incorporated into the UK listing rules. 
Hampel report (1998) further requires UK public companies to disclose compensation information of 
their directors. The recommendations of these three reports were combined to form part of London 
Stock Exchange Combined code, which regulates all companies listed on the exchange (FRC, 
Combined Code 2008). Consequently, compared with their counterparts in US, CEOs of UK listed 
firms are less likely to have strong influence over the remuneration committee during the negotiation 
of their compensation package. Instead, their compensation is structured to link reward to firm 
performance, which suggests that CEOs of UK firms are more likely to be compensated for their 
talents and capabilities that can improve firm performance. 
    Forbes et al. (2014) investigate the impact of CEO pay inequality on corporate performance using 
the UK FTSE 100 firms. Our study complements Forbes et al. (2014) in at least three ways. First, we 
focus on FTSE 250 firms while Forbes et al. (2014) look at FTSE 100 firms. FTSE 100 firms are the 
largest firms listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE), accounting for over 80% of the entire market 
capitalization of LSE, whereas FTSE 250 firms are relatively medium firms listed on LSE, 
representing an important but less researched section of the entire economy. Our inferences based on 
the analysis of data from FTSE 250 firms provide new insights into the interplay between CEO 
compensation, corporate governance and firm performance among medium-sized UK firms, which 
                                                          
3  The responsibilities of the remuneration committee include: 1) the determination of company-wide policy on 
remuneration; 2) the determination of individual remuneration package for each executive directors and other senior 
executives if appropriate; 3) reporting directly to shareholders on behalf of the board of directors on all matters relating to 
executive remuneration (Hughes 1996). 
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promotes our understanding of the operation and management of such firms. Second, our inferences 
are based on the analysis with multiple performance measures (e.g., Tobin’s Q and return on equity) 
but Forbes et al. (2014) draw conclusion only based on return to shareholders. Finally, we extend 
Forbes et al. (2014) by investigating the impact of CPS on corporate governance using a 
comprehensive set of governance variables and a larger sample size. We thus contribute to the 
literature on CEO compensation in the UK setting.  Our findings also have implication for the 
ongoing debate about whether high CEO compensation reflects high managerial talent or managerial 
power. The positive association between CPS/equity-based CPS and firm performance suggests that 
CEOs of public listed firms in UK are more likely to be compensated for their managerial talent. 
Finally, our study enriches the literature by providing evidence that institutional background may 
play an important role in deciding how CEOs are compensated in different countries. 
    The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and Section 3 
develops the hypotheses; Section 4 describes the data and research method; Section 5 presents the 
empirical results; Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
There is a substantial amount of literature examining the impact of senior managers, in particular 
CEOs on the organizations they lead. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that CEOs have different 
management styles as they move between firms, and these differences affect corporate decisions 
including investment, financing and organizational re-structure. Falato et al. (2011) document that 
talented CEOs (measured with reputation, career record, and educational background) are more 
likely to cut capital and M&A expenditures and shed excess capacities. Demerjian et al. (2011) 
measure CEO talent as the efficiency of the CEO in generating revenues with firm resources and find 
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that employing CEOs with higher ability is associated with improved firm performance in 
subsequent periods. 
   Other studies report mixed results on the stock market reaction to the decision of managerial 
turnover. While Warner et al. (1988) do not find any significant results, Weisbach (1988) documents 
significant and positive market reaction to turnover decisions. On the other hand, Khanna and 
Poulsen (1995) find negative effects. Denis and Denis (1995) find stock markets react positively to 
forced turnover while the reaction to CEO retirement is insignificant. Bennedsen et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that CEO deaths are associated with declining operating profitability, asset growth, 
and sales growth. In contrast, the deaths of other board members do not have strong impact on firm 
performance. Therefore, they conclude that CEOs are important for the success of ongoing operation, 
and their permanent or temporary absence impacts firm performance.  
   Managers may claim higher compensation because they have superior ability, or they have more 
influence over the board when negotiating their compensation packages. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 
propose the managerial power approach by arguing that weak corporate governance structure leads 
to an inefficient design of compensation contracts. For example, compensation for executives 
including CEOs will be higher in firms where managers have more power, or the board is relatively 
weak. Therefore, whether higher relative compensation reflects managerial talent or managerial 
power is an empirical question to be addressed in this study. 
    A growing stream of literature supports a positive association between corporate governance 
quality and firm performance. Empirical studies document a positive association between the 
percentage of independent directors and Tobin’s Q (Core et al. 1999). In a similar vein, Conyon and 
Peck (1998) conclude that board size is negatively associated with corporate performance measured 
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by return on equity. In terms of insider ownership and firm performance, previous literature reports a 
positive relationship between insider ownership and firm performance (see for example, Agrawal 
and Knoeber 1996; Ho 2005).  Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with strong corporate 
governance  have higher value. Furthermore, stock returns of firms with good corporate governance 
outperform those of firms with weak governance. Bebchuk et al. (2009) identify six provisions to 
create an “entrenchment index (E-index)”. 4  They show that stock returns are lower for firms with 
higher E-index score. Overall the literature suggests that firms with good governance tend to have 
higher value.  
    Beyer et al. (2010) state that the stewardship role allows capital providers to manage and utilize 
their invested capital in a certain firm. Using a corporate governance disclosure index as a proxy for 
the quality of corporate governance, Cheung et al. (2011) find that firms with higher quality of 
corporate governance exhibit a subsequent increase in market value, whereas those with lower 
quality of corporate governance exhibit a decrease in market value. This suggests that the quality of 
corporate governance affects stock market participants when valuing firms. Sheu et al. (2011) focus 
only on one particular type of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. information related to 
compensation paid to directors and executives). They find that the stock market participants provide 
a higher valuation for those firms which disclose more information about their compensation 
practices.  
    In the present study, we follow Cheung et al (2011) and Sheu et al. (2011) and consider corporate 
governance practice, measured by corporate governance ratings, when examining the association 
                                                          
4
 Among the six provisions, four limit shareholder rights (staggered boards, limits to shareholder amendments of bylaws, 
supermajority requirement for merger and charter amendment) and the other two make potential hostile takeover more 
difficult (poison pills and golden parachute). Therefore, higher index score implies that the firm is entrenched, or has 
weak governance. 
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between CPS and firm performance. Prior research shows that corporate governance practice is 
associated with lower cost of external capital (Anderson et al. 2003; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; 
Anderson et al. 2004; Klock et al. 2005; Cremers et al, 2007; Chava et al. 2009; Lorca et al. 2011). 
For example, cheap external funding might not be a major concern for large firms, as a result, 
offering more information to stock market participants may help to alleviate the litigation risks, 
reduce the volatility of stock price fluctuations, and enhance the management talent, signalling 
effects which will have an impact on the firms’ valuation.  
3. Hypothesis development 
Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we measure the relative importance of the CEO with CEO pay slice 
(CPS), which is the percentage of the total compensation of top-five executives that is captured by 
the CEO. We also compute the equity-based CPS as the percentage of the total equity-linked 
compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO. It is essential to note that as CPS is 
computed using the compensation information of executives from the same firm, it automatically 
controls for the firm-specific characteristics that affect the average level of compensation that varies 
from firm to firm or industry to industry. However, the characteristics of CEO (e.g., talent and 
expertise) may still have an effect on CPS. For example, using a sample of executives who switched 
jobs between 1992 and 2007, Carter et al. (2010) find that talented executives received pay 
premiums at their new employer, after controlling for the standard determinants of compensation.
5
 
                                                          
5 Carter et al. (2010) use two sets of proxies to capture the talent of executives. The first set of variables captures 
characteristics of the executives’ managerial position and professional profile at the prior firm, while the second set of 
variables measure firm performance and financial reporting quality of the executives’ former employer over their 
managerial tenure. 
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Regarding the association between CPS/equity-based CPS and firm performance, we develop two 
competing hypotheses based on different theories. According to the managerial talent hypothesis, 
higher CPS may imply the outstanding talent and ability of the CEO, which can contribute to strong 
performance of the firm. Falato et al. (2011) show that the CEO’s total compensation is an increasing 
function of the CEO’s talent. CEO, as the most important executive in a firm, is playing a crucial 
role in making corporate decisions and is taking the major responsibility to maximize shareholder’s 
wealth. Talented CEO is able to claim higher compensation relative to other executives in the firm, 
because CEO’s judgement and expertise can make a difference in decision-making that affects future 
prospects of the firm. Furthermore, talented CEOs may have better outside opportunities, so higher 
compensation is necessary to increase the opportunity cost of voluntary departure.  
    Consistent with the managerial power hypothesis, CEO might have more power when the 
corporate governance is weak (e.g., less independent board), which can be reflected by higher CPS. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that CEOs are more likely to take advantage of their power to 
negotiate an excessive compensation package with the board. As a result, the CPS is more likely to 
skew to the excessive side, which signals governance/agency problem in a firm. The weak corporate 
governance may have negative effect on firm performance (Conyon and Peck 1998; Ho 2005; Brown 
and Caylor 2006).  
      In this study we also look into this aspect but from corporate governance ratings perspectives.  
Corporate governance ratings have been widely used in the governance-performance literature (see 
for example Ben Amar and Boujenoui 2011; Epps and Cereola 2008; Drobetz et al. 2004; Ertugrul 
and Hegde 2009). Bozec and Bozec (2012) find that a consistent finding across all governance-
performance studies is that there is a positive association between governance ratings and firm 
performance. Furthermore, prior research suggests that good governance practices mitigate the 
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under-valuation of accounting earnings (Chen and Kao 2010). Finally, different studies (e.g. Cheung 
et al. 2011; and Sheu et al. 2011) examine the effect of corporate governance disclosure on firm 
value and their findings are consistent with the argument of Healy et al. (1999). In particular, they 
find a positive association between corporate governance disclosure and firm value. Based on the 
above discussion, we propose the following hypotheses: 
Managerial talent hypothesis (H1a): Higher level of CPS is positively associated with future firm 
performance.
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Managerial power hypothesis (H1b): Higher level of CPS is negatively associated with future firm 
performance. 
H2: Higher level of corporate governance ratings is positively associated with future firm 
performance. 
4. Research design 
 4.1 Data 
Our study focuses on FTSE 250 firms in UK.
7
 We first collect data on CEO compensation from the 
BoardEx database.
8
 CPS is calculated as follows: first, we compute the total annual compensation of 
each executive for a sample firm as the sum of direct compensation and total equity linked 
compensation (including the Black and Scholes value of the options granted, payouts of long-term 
incentive plans and equity-based long-term compensation). Next, we select the value of 
                                                          
6 We regress firm performance in year t+1 on CPS in year t in the empirical analysis. 
7
 Consistent with previous literature, we exclude financial institutions and utility firms. 
8
UK publicly listed firms are required by the Directors' Remuneration Report Regulations (2002) to disclose information 
on executive as well as non-executive’s compensation (including cash compensation, share options and long-term 
incentive schemes) in a separate “Director’s remuneration report” as part of the annual report. 
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compensation of five most highly paid executives for one firm in a given fiscal year.
9
 CPS is the 
percentage of the CEO’s compensation divided by the compensation of the five executives. Then we 
replace the total compensation with equity-linked compensation and compute the equity-based CPS.  
 For the corporate governance disclosure index, we follow the recent paper of Al-Najjar and Ding 
(2014) by using the RiskMetrics Group. This database contains 55 CGQ governance factors which 
cover eight categories of corporate governance including board, compensation, takeover, and audit. 
We compute an overall measure of corporate governance quality score (Al-Najjar and Ding, 2014). 
CGQ provides corporate governance ranking for more than 7,500 firms worldwide since 2003. 
Therefore, our sample period covers 2003-2009, as 2009 is the most recent year when the data are 
available. Other corporate governance data such as board size, board independence and institutional 
ownership are collected from annual reports.
10
 Capital market data including Tobin’s Q, leverage, 
return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE), market to book ratio, total assets and capital 
expenditure are collected from DataStream, and we match the firm-specific data with CPS using firm 
name. Our final sample consists of 130 firms. 
4.2 Research Method 
4.2.1 The determinant of CPS 
In order to investigate whether CEOs are highly paid thanks to their overwhelming managerial power, 
we regress CPS on corporate governance quality index reflected by CGI, CEO characteristics, board 
characteristics and firm-specific variables. We use the following model: 
itititititti ControlscteristicsBoardCharaInowneristicsCEOCharactCGICPS   210,     (1)                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
                                                          
9
 We drop firms for which CEO is not among the five most highly paid executives. 
10
 We follow the corporate governance literature by including board size, board independence and institutional ownership 
in our models (see for example McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Larmou and Vafeas, 2010). 
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CPS is the CEO pay slice measured as the percentage of the total compensation of top-five 
executives that is captured by the CEO; CGI is the value of corporate governance disclosure score; 
CEO Characteristics include CEO tenure (number of years since becoming CEO), CEO chair 
(duality) and CEO gender. Board characteristics include board independence and board size. We also 
add institutional ownership (Inown) to our models. Controls are firm-specific characteristics 
including size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, risk (captured by beta), Tobin’s Q, ROE and ratio of 
capital expenditure to total assets. We also include year dummies and industry dummies in the 
regression, and the standard errors are clustered at firm level. If the managerial power prediction 
holds, we expect CPS to be negatively associated with CGI, because high CGI indicates better 
quality of corporate governance. Furthermore, according to managerial power story CPS is likely to 
be higher when the board is weak (e.g., less independent).Finally, we substitute CPS with equity-
based CPS (ECPS) and repeat the analysis. 
4.2.2 CPS and firm performance 
First, following a substantial literature that measures firm performance with Tobin’s Q (Lang and 
Stulz 1994; Core et al. 1999; Gompers et al. 2003; Brown and Caylor 2006), we measure firm 
performance in year t+1 with Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as the market value of common equity 
plus the book value of preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets. To 
control for possible endogeneity between firm performance and the corporate governance factors, we 
use the Instrumental Variable (IV) model to test our hypotheses. The instrument variables used in the 
model are the first lag of the corporate governance variables, and the standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level.
11
 We also control for the non-linear relationship between board size and institutional 
ownership by including their square terms. In the regression we include year dummies and industry 
                                                          
11 The Shea partial R2 for the instrument variables in all our models is higher than 0.50. In addition, the first stage 
regression in our models indicates a good significant level and power. Hence the instruments in our case are not weak.  
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dummies to control for secular trends and industry-specific confounding effects, but for brevity we 
do not report their coefficients in the tables. 
ititititititti ControlsCGVDNTERACTIONCgidumCPSsQTobin   I' 32101,               (2) 
    We create Cgidum as a dummy variable that takes one for observations with their value of 
corporate governance ratings score above the sample mean, zero otherwise. Following Cheung et al 
(2011) and Sheu et al (2011), we expect a positive association between Cgidum and Tobin’s Q.   
INTERACTION is the interaction between CPS and Cgidum. Following Hussainey and Walker 
(2009), we identify four logical possibilities for the interaction between CPS and Cgidum. First, if 
Cgidum and CPS are different ways of conveying the same information (substitutes), then the 
coefficient on CPS will be equal to the coefficient on Cgidum. In addition, the INTERACTION 
should be negative and equal in absolute value to the coefficients on CPS or Cgidum.   
    Second, if Cgidum and CPS convey unrelated types of information then performance for firms that 
have high levels of Cgidum and lower CPS should be stronger than performance for firms that have 
high levels of both Cgidum and CPS.  Similarly, firm performance should be stronger when both 
high levels of Cgidum and low CPS are present than when only the high levels of Cgidum is present. 
In this case both Cgidum and CPS provide (‘additive’) unrelated information, so we predict the 
INTERACTION should be positive and insignificantly different from zero.  
    Third, if Cgidum and CPs provide complementary information that is reinforcing, then the 
interaction should be significantly larger than zero, because firms with either good internal 
governance reflected by high Cgi or larger proportion of executive compensation claimed by CEO 
tend to have better performance. However, if the coefficient of interaction is positive, we expect that 
the sum of coefficients of Cgidum, CPS and INTERACTION should be significantly greater than the 
sum of coefficients of Cgidum and CPS. 
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    Finally, if Cgidum and CPS convey related information, but some of the information is common to 
both (partially additive), then performance for firms that have high levels of Cgidum and low CPS 
should be higher than performance of those that have high levels of Cgidum but pay high CEO 
compensation. Similarly, firm performance should be higher when both higher Cgidum and lower 
CPS are present. In this case, one may predict that the INTERACTION should be significantly less 
than zero. In other words, the sum of Cgidum, CPS and INTERACTION should be significantly less 
than the sum of the coefficients on Cgidum and CPS. The inference is that both CPS and Cgidum are 
partial substitutes.  
    In Model (2), we control for a number of corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
characteristics. CGVD refers to corporate governance mechanisms. These include board size, board 
independence and institutional ownership. We also control for leverage (total debt divided by total 
assets); ROE (net income divided by total equity); investment opportunities (capital expenditure 
divided by total assets); growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio); firm size (logarithm of total 
assets) and firm risk (beta). The coefficients of interest are  1  and 3 . 
     Next, we substitute CPS with equity-based CPS (ECPS) and re-run the model with the necessary 
modifications of the interaction term. Consistent with previous literature that utilizes accounting 
measures to reflect firm performance (e.g., Larcker et al. 2007; Bebchuk et al. 2010), we replace 
Tobin’s Q with ROE (net income divided by total equity), and re-estimate the model with the 
following regressions:
12 
ititititititti ControlsCGVDNTERACTIONCgidumCPSROE   I32101,         (3) 
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 We exclude ROE as one of the control variable in these analyses. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Summary statistics and correlation 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the variables. The mean of CPS (ECPS) is 0.43 (0.44), 
which suggests that on average CEO compensation represents 43% (44%) of the total compensation 
of the five most highly-paid executives within a firm. The mean of corporate governance disclosure 
score (CGI) is 86.64, indicating that on average firms have relatively good record on corporate 
governance quality. The average board has around 8 members, while 48% of board members are 
independent. The percentage of ownership by institutional investors is 16.67%. ROE (return on 
equity) is 17.41% for the average sample, which suggests that the sample firms have relatively strong 
performance. The average capital expenditure is 4.2% of total assets and average market-to-book 
ratio is 2.84. 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
    Table 2 reports the pair-wise correlation between the variables. Tobin’s Q is positively related 
with ROE, as firms with higher accounting performance also have better valuation (performance). 
Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with institutional ownership, as institutional investors have 
reduced cost to monitor the management, which contributes to firm performance. Tobin’s Q is 
negatively related to leverage and firm size. Importantly, CPS and ECPS are significantly correlated, 
as nowadays equity-linked compensation takes an increasing proportion of total compensation for 
executives. The correlation between CPS (ECPS) and corporate governance disclosure score (CGI) is 
positive and significant. CPS (ECPS) is also positively correlated with firm size, consistent with the 
view that large firms compensate CEOs with higher remuneration. Corporate governance disclosure 
score is positively correlated with board independence and firm size, which suggests that large firms 
and independent boards are likely to improve quality of corporate governance. The correlation 
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between board size and firm size is positive and significant, as large firms are likely to have big 
boards. Finally, board independence is positively related to firm size, as large firms are expected to 
have more independent boards. Table 2 shows that the correlations between variables are low to 
moderate, which suggests that multicolinearity is not a serious concern in our specification. 
<< Insert Table 2 about here> 
5.2 The determinant of CPS  
We investigate in this Section the link between corporate governance and CEO pay slice. This issue 
has been investigated in previous studies and it is reported that there is an important link between 
corporate governance and CEO pay (Guy 2005; Forbes et al. 2014). Following  Forbes et al. (2014) 
who investigate the impact of board specifications on CPS,  Table 3, Panel A provides the regression 
results with CPS as dependent variable and CGI, CEO characteristics, board characteristics (board 
independence and board size), institutional ownership and firm-specific variables as explanatory 
variables. In Model 1 we include CGI, CEO characteristics, institutional ownership, board 
independence and board size. In Model 2 we add the square terms of board size and institutional 
ownership to control for possible non-linear relationship between CPS and board size and 
institutional ownership. In Model 3 we further add firm-specific variables (size, leverage, market-to-
book, risk, Tobin’s Q, ROE and capital expenditure) as additional controls. Across the models the 
coefficient of CGI (corporate governance disclosure score) is positive and significant, which 
suggests that CEOs at firms with high quality governance are likely to claim higher relative 
compensation. The coefficient of CEOChair is negative and significant across the models, which 
implies that CEOs get lower compensation when they chair the board. This can be explained by the 
institutional background in UK, as CEOs don’t have undue influence over the remuneration 
committee to decide their compensation even if they lead the board. Furthermore, the coefficient of 
board independence is positively significant across the models, indicating that firms with more 
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independent board are likely to reward CEOs with high relative remuneration. The coefficient of 
board size is negative and significant, which suggests that CEOs are more likely to receive lower 
compensation in firms with large board. It is plausible that large board strengthens the governance 
and increases the monitoring of the CEOs. Regarding the coefficients of the firm-specific variables, 
none of them are significant. Our findings are broadly consistent with those reported in Bebchuk et al. 
(2010), because leverage, market-to-book and capital expenditure are not significantly related to CPS 
in their analysis. 
     We replace the dependent variable with ECPS and re-estimate the regressions. The results are 
reported in Table 3, Panel B. Consistent with findings based on CPS, the coefficient of CGI 
(corporate governance disclosure score) is positively significant and the coefficient of board 
independence is strongly positive across the models, which confirms that CEOs are mole likely to get 
higher relative compensation when the governance quality of the firm is higher and the board is more 
independent. The coefficient of board size is significantly negative in Models 1 and 2, while the 
coefficient of CEOChair is negative and significant in Model 1. Similar to results in Panel A, none of 
the coefficients of firm-specific variables are significant. 
    Overall our findings are at odds with the prediction of managerial power hypothesis, which argues 
that CEOs are likely to receive high relative compensation in firms with poor governance because 
they have increasing negotiation power over the board. In contrast, we find that firms with high 
quality of governance reflected by higher CGI and more independent boards are likely to reward 
CEOs with high remuneration. Furthermore, CEOs receive lower compensation when they chair the 
board of directors. It is likely that the strengthened internal governance of UK public corporations 
reduced the influence and negotiation power of CEOs, so they do not get higher remuneration due to 
their managerial power. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here>> 
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5.3 Results on the association between CPS and firm performance 
We discuss the results on the association between CPS (equity-based CPS) and Tobin’s Q in 5.3.1, 
results on the association between CPS (equity-based CPS) and ROE in 5.3.2, and results on the 
association between CPS (equity-based CPS) and sub-index related to board, compensation and 
takeover in 5.3.3. 
5.3.1 Results on the association between CPS/ECPS and Tobin’s Q 
We run six models with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, and present the results in Table 4. In 
Models 1 to 3 (Models 4 to 6) CPS (Equity-based CPS) is included as the explanatory variable of 
central interest. To control for the possible curvilinear relationship between corporate governance 
variables and firm performance, in Model 1 we include the square term of board size and 
institutional ownership. Year dummies and industry dummies are introduced to control for the 
secular trend and industry-specific effect. In Model 2, we leave out the square terms of board size 
and institutional ownership. In Model 3, we retain the square of board size and institutional 
ownership but skip the year-indicators.  In Model 1 the coefficient of CPS is positive and significant 
(1.530, P= 0.05), which suggests a positive association between future firm valuation measured by 
Tobin’Q and CPS. The coefficients of Cgidum and the interaction term between Cgidum and CPS 
are both insignificant.  The results in Model 2 are similar to those in Model 1, in that coefficient of 
CPS is positive and significant (0.294, P= 0.10). Coefficients of Cgidum and interaction are again 
insignificant. Finally, the results in Model 3 confirm the positive association between CPS future 
firm valuation measured by Tobin’s Q, and the coefficients of Cgidum and the interaction term 
remain insignificant. We repeat the analysis in Models 4 to 6 where ECPS is the explanatory variable 
of main interest. In Model 4 the coefficient of ECPS is significantly positive (1.306, P= 0.05), and in 
Model 6 the coefficient of ECPS remains positive and significant (1.519, P=0.01). The coefficient of 
ECPS in Model 5 is positive but insignificant. The findings suggest that CEOs who are able to 
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contribute to the future performance of their firms get relatively high equity-linked compensation. In 
Models 4 to 6 the coefficients of Cgidum and the interaction term between Cgidum and ECPS 
remain insignificant. Overall our findings lend support to H1a (the managerial talent hypothesis), as 
CEOs are compensated for their superior talent and skills, which contributes to better firm valuation 
in the future. 
    Among the control variables, the coefficient of board size is positive and significant across the 
regressions except for Models 3 and 6. It is likely that large board consisting of members with 
diversified expertise and experience can support managerial decision-making, which in turn 
contributes to firm value. This finding is in line with Larmou and Vafeas (2010), who report a 
positive association between board size and firm value. However, board size is positively related to 
the cost of information sharing and monitoring, which implies that when the board becomes larger, 
the positive effect on firm value gradually weakens. After crossing a certain threshold, the effect of 
board size on firm value could even turn into negative. This is supported by our results that the 
square term of board size is negatively associated with firm value. Such finding is also consistent 
with the non-linear relationship between corporate governance and firm performance documented by 
previous literature (McConnell and Servaes 1990), the coefficient of the square of board size is 
negative and significant in Models 1 and 4. The coefficient of firm size is negative and significant 
across the regressions. Finally, the coefficient of MB (market-to-book) is strongly positive across the 
six models, which suggests that firms with higher growth opportunity are likely to have higher firm 
valuation. 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
 
20 
 
5.3.2 Results on the association between CPS/ECPS and ROE 
We run six models with ROE (return on equity) as the dependent variable. Consistently, in Models 1 
to 3 (Models 4 to 6) CPS (equity-based CPS) is included as the explanatory variable of main interest. 
The results are provided in Table 5.  In Model 1 the coefficient of CPS is positive and significant 
(20.823, P= 0.10), which suggests a positive association between CPS and future accounting 
performance measured by ROE.  In Model 2 the coefficient of CPS is positive and significant 
(17.036, P= 0.05). Finally, the results in Model 3 confirm the positive association between CPS and 
future accounting performance reflected by ROE (20.023, P= 0.05). The coefficients of Cgidum 
remain insignificant while the interaction is negatively associated with ROE in Models (1) and (3).  
     We repeat the regressions in Models 4 to 6 where ECPS is the variable of central interest. In 
Models 4 and 6 the coefficients of ECPS is significantly positive (15.516, P= 0.05; 16.528, P= 0.05), 
and in Model 5 the coefficient of ECPS is positive but insignificant. In Models 4 to 6 the coefficients 
of Cgidum and the interaction between Cgidum and ECPS remain insignificant, Overall our results, 
which are consistent with findings based on Tobin’s Q, support H1a, as firms with high CPS/ECPS 
tend to have better accounting performance measured by ROE. 
     Regarding the control variables, the coefficient of board size is positive but insignificant. The 
coefficient of risk is negative and significant across the models, indicating that more risky firms have 
lower future performance. Finally, the coefficient of MB (market-to-book) is strongly positive across 
the models, which suggests that firms with higher growth opportunity have better future performance 
measured by ROE. 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
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5.3.3 Results on the association between CPS/ECPS and sub-index related to board, compensation 
and takeover 
Finally, we replace CG index (CGI) with sub-index related to board, compensation and takeover, and 
test whether these sub-indices have an impact of CPS (Models 1 and 2) and ECPS (Models 3 and 4). 
The results, which are reported in Table 6, are generally consistent with early findings. In Models 1 
the coefficient of board-sub is positive and significant (0.026, P= 0.05), which suggests a strong and 
effective board reflected by a higher board sub-index is positively associated with CPS.  In Model 2, 
we do not include the year and industry dummies, and find largely consistent results (the coefficient 
of board-sub is 0.023 P= 0.10). We also report evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between 
board size and CPS, as the coefficients of board size are significantly negative while the coefficients 
of square term of board size are significantly positive in both Models 1 and 2. The findings related to 
control variables are broadly consistent with those reported in Table 3. 
    We re-estimate the regressions in Models 3 and 4 by substituting CPS with ECPS. In Models 3 
and 4 the coefficients of board-sub are significant and positive (0.029, P= 0.10; 0.024, P= 0.10), 
suggesting that an effective board is positively associated with ECPS. The results pertaining to 
control variables are also consistent with those reported in Table 3. 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
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6. Conclusion 
We follow Bebchuk et al. (2011) and measure the relative importance of the CEO with the 
percentage of the total compensation of five highly paid executives that is captured by the CEO 
(CPS). High CPS may indicate that the CEO has superior capability or skills, which enhances his/her 
contribution to the firm (managerial talent hypothesis). Alternatively, high CPS can be explained by 
the managerial power approach, since weak corporate governance structure will lead to inefficient 
design of compensation contract, thus powerful CEOs will take this advantage to maximize their 
remuneration.  
     Based the analysis on a sample of non-financial UK firms, we show that higher CPS is positively 
associated with firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q after controlling the firm-specific 
characteristics and governance variables that have been documented to affect performance. We 
report similar results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm 
performance. Our results remain unaffected when we use return on assets and return on equity to 
reflect accounting performance of the firm. Our findings largely support the managerial talent 
hypothesis, as CEOs of listed firms in UK with outstanding capability and skills are able to enhance 
firm performance and are thus rewarded with relatively higher compensation. We interpret the 
difference between the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2011) and ours with the different institutional 
background between US and UK: since 1990’s a series of reports have been issued to strengthen the 
internal governance of public corporation in UK. In particular, the Greenbury report, which was 
issued in 1995, recommends the establishment of remuneration committee comprising entirely of 
non-executive directors to decide the remuneration policy and the remuneration of individual 
executive directors. As a result, relative to their counterparts in the US, UK CEOs are less likely to 
have overwhelming influences on the remuneration committee when negotiation their compensation 
package. Instead, they are likely to be compensated for their managerial talent and capability. Finally, 
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we find limited evidence of substitutive relationship between CPS/ECPS and corporate governance 
disclosure quality. We further show that firms with better corporate governance disclosure tend to 
have higher CPS, suggesting that talented CEOs are more likely to be employed by well-governed 
firms. 
    Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we corroborate findings of 
early studies on CEO compensation and firm performance in the UK and contribute to the ongoing 
debate about whether high CEO compensation reflects high managerial talent or managerial power. 
The positive association between CPS/equity-based CPS and firm performance suggests that CEOs 
of public listed firms in UK are more likely to be compensated for their managerial talent and 
capability. Second, we enrich the literature by providing evidence that institutional background may 
play a key role in deciding how CEOs are compensated in different countries. 
    Our study is subject to several limitations, however. First, although we take the standard 
instrumental variable approach to mitigate the potential endogeneity problem in our analysis, we are 
unable to rule out the endogeneity problem in our model. Second, our tests are based on a relatively 
small sample of 130 firms. Third, our sample period (2003-2009) falls into the post-corporate 
governance reform era in UK, so we are not able to disentangle the effect of the reform on the 
association between CEO compensation and firm performance. Finally, different corporate 
governance proxies can be used to investigate their effects on different measurers of firm 
performance and value.  We leave this for future research. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable    Mean      Std. Dev.     Min     Max 
          
Tobin's Q 1.47 1.43 0.00 25.26 
CPS 0.43 0.15 0.002 1.00 
ECPS 0.44 0.18 0.0005 1.00 
CGI 86.64 11.64 0.00 100  
Cgidum 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Bsize 8.34 2.15 1.00 20.00 
Independ 0.48 0.12 0.00 0.78 
Inown 16.67 15.50 4.92 73.40 
Lev 0.27 0.60 0.00 8.39 
ROE 17.41 16.29 -66.34 76.71 
Capexp 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.19 
MB 2.84 4.45 -99.60 18.78 
Size 5.82 0.60 1.16 7.91 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferred equity 
and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets, CPS is the CEO pay Slice 
measured as the percentage of the total compensation of top-five executives that is 
captured by the CEO; ECPS is the equity-based CEO pay Slice measured as the 
percentage of the total equity-based compensation of top-five executives that is captured 
by the CEO; Cgidum is a dummy variable that takes one for observations with their value 
of corporate governance reporting index above the sample mean, zero otherwise; Bsize is 
the board size measured by number of directors in the board; Independ is the percentage 
of independent directors in the board; Inown is the percentage of institutional ownership; 
Lev is total debt to total asset ratio; ROE is the ratio of net income to total equity;  Capexp 
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is ratio of capital expenditures to total assets MB is market to book ratio, Size is natural 
logarithm of total assets.  
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 Table 2: Correlation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2. CPS -0.12*** 1.00
3. ECPS -0.11*** 0.96*** 1.00
4. CGI -0.06 0.10** 0.10** 1.00
11. MB 0.32*** 0.01 0.002 -0.02 -0.06* 0.03 0.04 -0.10*** 0.26 0.03 1.00
12. Size -0.39*** 0.06* 0.07* 0.09** 0..39*** 0.38*** -0.13*** -0.43*** -0.36*** -0.03 -0.04 1.00
1. Tobin's Q 1.00
5. BSize -0.05 -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.10** 1.00
6. Independ -0.11*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.12*** -0.05 1.00
7. Inown 0.13*** 0.003 -0.01 -0.02 0.09** -0.05 1.00
8. Lev -0.07** 0.02 0.02 0.10** -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.12*** 1.00
9. ROE 0.15*** -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.004 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 1.00
10. Capexp 0.050 0.04 0.05 -0.002 -0.08** 0.06* 0.05 -0.11*** 0.10*** 1.00
 
Tobin’s Q is the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets, CPS is the 
CEO pay Slice measured as the percentage of the total compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; ECPS is the equity-based CEO pay 
Slice measured as the percentage of the total equity-based compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; Cgidum is a dummy variable that 
takes one for observations with their value of corporate governance reporting index above the sample mean, zero otherwise; Bsize is the board size measured 
by number of directors in the board; Independ is the percentage of independent directors in the board; Inown is the percentage of institutional ownership; Lev 
is total debt to total asset ratio; ROE is the ratio of net income to total equity;  Capexp is ratio of capital expenditures to total assets MB is market to book 
ratio, Size is natural logarithm of total assets.  
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Table 3, Panel A: Regression Results on determinant of CPS. 
Dependent Variable: CPS  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef.                SE 
CGI 0.001** 0.0001 0.001** 0.0001 0.001** 0.000 
CEOTen 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
CEOChair -0.103*** 0.039 -0.101* 0.060 -0.075 0.064 
CEOGen -0.015 0.025 -0.016 0.025 -0.046 0.040 
Inown 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Independ 0.420*** 0.072 0.439*** 0.081 0.393*** 0.089 
Bsize -0.025*** 0.005 -0.034* 0.018 -0.088*** 0.034 
Bsize
2 
  
0.001 0.001 0.003* 0.002 
Inown
2
 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lev 
    
-0.004 0.089 
MB 
    
-0.003 0.005 
Tobin 
    
-0.007 0.015 
ROE 
    
0.000 0.001 
Capexp 
    
0.066 0.370 
Size 
    
0.031 0.032 
Risk 
    
0.002 0.015 
Cons 0.391*** 0.071 0.414* 0.087 0.607*** 0.228 
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Number of clustered firms 130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 R
2
 0.259 
 
0.260 
 
0.280 
  
CPS is the CEO pay slice measured as the percentage of the total compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; CGI is the value of 
corporate governance disclosure index; CEOTen is CEO tenure, CEOChair is a dummy variable that takes one if CEO is the chair of the board, zero 
otherwise; CEOGen is a dummy variable is CEO is male, zero otherwise. Inown is the percentage of institutional ownership; Independ is the percentage of 
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independent directors in the board; Bsize is the board size measured by number of directors in the board; Bsize
2
 and Inown
2 
are the squares of the board size 
and percentage of institutional ownership, respectively; Lev is total debt to total asset ratio;  MB is market to book ratio, Size is natural logarithm of total 
assets; Tobin’s Q is the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets; ROE 
is ratio of net income to total equity; Capexp is ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. 
***, **, * indicate coefficient is significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively.  
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Table 3, Panel B: Regression results on determinant of  ECPS 
      
 Dependent Variable: ECPS  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
 Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef.                SE 
CGI 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.0001 
CEOTen 0.000 0.002 0.0001 0.002 0.0001 0.002 
CEOChair -0.101** 0.041 -0.095 0.064 -0.074 0.068 
CEOGen -0.018 0.027 -0.019 0.027 -0.050 0.043 
Inown 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Independ 0.445*** 0.078 0.454*** 0.086 0.409*** 0.096 
Bsize -0.027*** 0.006 -0.033* 0.019 -0.082** 0.040 
Bsize
2 
  0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002 
Inown
2
   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lev     -0.014 0.100 
Mb     -0.003 0.005 
Tobin     -0.006 0.016 
ROE     0.000 0.001 
Capexp     0.070 0.397 
Size     0.035 0.035 
Risk     -0.002 0.015 
Cons 0.415*** 0.075 0.429*** 0.093 0.574** 0.261 
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of clustered firms 130.000  130.000  130.000  
R
2
 0.310  0.310  0.330  
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ECPS is the equity-based CEO pay slice measured as the percentage of the total equity-based compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; 
CGI is the value of corporate governance disclosure index; CEOTen is CEO tenure, CEOChair is a dummy variable that takes one if CEO is the chair of the 
board, zero otherwise; CEOGen is a dummy variable is CEO is male, zero otherwise. Inown is the percentage of institutional ownership; Independ is the 
percentage of independent directors in the board; Bsize is the board size measured by number of directors in the board; Bsize
2
 and Inown
2 
are the squares of 
the board size and percentage of institutional ownership, respectively; Lev is total debt to total asset ratio; Risk is measured by firm’s historical beta; MB is 
market to book ratio, Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Tobin’s Q is the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferred equity and 
long-term debt divided by the book value of assets; ROE is ratio of net income to total equity; Capexp is ratio of capital expenditures to total assets; Standard 
errors are clustered at firm level. 
***, **, * indicate coefficient is significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels respectively.  
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Table 4: Regression results with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Tobin’s Q 
(1)        (2)     (3)         (4)      (5)     (6) 
                                              Coef.                       SE            Coef.            SE              Coef.                 SE                 Coef.            SE               Coef.             SE             Coef.                 SE 
 
Independ -0.828 1.298 -0.706 0.678 -1.488 1.194 -0.829 1.270 -0.709 0.676 -1.480 1.169 
Bsize 3.298*** 1.209 0.110** 0.047 2.502** 0.992 3.203*** 1.162 0.110** 0.047 2.420*** 0.962 
Inown -0.036*** 0.038 -0.004 0.004 -0.028 0.035 -0.036 0.038 -0.004 0.004 -0.028 0.035 
CPS 1.530** 0.769 0.294 0.348 1.742*** 0.620 
      ECPS 
      
1.306* 0.657 0.266 0.328 1.519*** 0.538 
Cgidum 0.143 0.278 0.082 0.178 0.100 0.272 0.079 0.265 0.072 0.173 0.042 0.257 
Interaction -0.976 0.638 -0.259 0.385 -0.932 0.598 
      Interaction2 
      
-0.790 0.575 -0.232 0.361 -0.764 0.544 
bsize
2
 -0.175*** 0.065 -0.132** 0.055 -0.170*** 0.063   -0.128*** 0.053 
inown
2
 0.001 0.001   0.0001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.0001 0.001 
Lev 1.514** 0.756 0.784** 0.377 0.972 0.642 1.489** 0.738 0.783** 0.377 0.954 0.633 
Roe -0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.005 -0.002 0.008 
Capexp 4.095* 2.491 0.928 1.428 2.397 2.205 3.982* 2.436 0.925 1.426 2.348 2.162 
Mb 0.236*** 0.063 0.235*** 0.052 0.239*** 0.060 0.236*** 0.063 0.236*** 0.051 0.240*** 0.059 
Size -1.750*** 0.428 -1.158*** 0.214 -1.447*** 0.289 -1.726*** 0.416 -1.156*** 0.214 -1.429*** 0.284 
Risk 0.026 0.127 0.0001 0.090 0.193 0.148 0.029 0.125 0.001 0.090 0.192 0.146 
Cons -4.233 4.705 6.799*** 1.143 -2.213 4.438 -2.504 4.289 7.131*** 1.186 -1.881 4.319 
Year dummies Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
No  
 Industry dummies Yes  
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
No  
 Number of clustered firms 130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 R
2
 0.180 
 
0.180 
 
0.280 
 
0.200 
 
0.670 
 
0.300 
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Tobin’s Q is the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferred equity and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets, Independ is 
the percentage of independent directors in the board; Bsize is the board size measured by number of directors in the board; Inown is the percentage of 
institutional ownership; CPS is the CEO pay Slice measured as the percentage of the total compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; 
ECPS is the equity-based CEO pay Slice measured as the percentage of the total equity-based compensation of top-five executives that is captured by the 
CEO; Cgidum is a dummy variable that takes one for observations with their value of corporate governance reporting index above the sample mean, zero 
otherwise; Interaction is the interaction between CPS and Cgidum; Interaction2 is the interaction between ECPS and Cgidum. Bsize
2
 and Inown
2 
are the 
squares of the board size and percentage of institutional ownership, respectively; Lev is total debt to total asset ratio; ROE is net income to total equity ratio;  
MB is market to book ratio; Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Risk is measured by firm’s historical beta; Capexp is ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 5:  Regression results with ROE as the dependent variable  
 
Dependent Variable: ROE      (1)        (2)     (3)         (4)      (5)     (6) 
 Coef.                       SE            Coef.            SE              Coef.           SE                 Coef.            SE               Coef.            SE             Coef.                    SE 
 
Independ -17.757 17.570 -14.312 15.245 -20.498 17.553 -16.593 16.893 -14.047 15.403 -20.316 18.380 
Bsize 18.063 19.694 0.788 0.771 18.016 16.967 13.835 19.115 0.747 0.769 20.672 18.064 
Inown 0.091 0.543 -0.054 0.075 0.300 0.528 0.116 0.524 -0.052 0.075 0.297 0.554 
CPS 20.823** 8.647 17.036* 9.848 20.023** 9.785 
      ECPS 
      
15.516** 7.169 14.334 9.162 16.528*** 9.181 
Cgidum 3.444 5.035 4.390 4.045 4.595 5.085 2.705 5.024 3.700 3.928 2.944 5.305 
Interaction -17.794* 10.362 -15.188 10.123 -19.677* 10.664 
      Interaction2 
      
-14.719 9.990 -13.453 9.799 -16.634 10.552 
bsize
2
 -0.953 1.054   -0.962 0.903 -0.730 1.023   -1.107 0.961 
inown
2
 -0.005 0.010   -0.008 0.011 -0.005 0.010   -0.008 0.011 
Lev -13.365 12.754 
-
16.727** 8.061 -9.584 10.849 -14.566 12.540 
-
16.649** 8.090 -8.601 11.344 
capexp 1.930 41.792 -9.966 30.270 5.317 35.761 -1.713 40.162 -10.158 30.266 7.297 37.286 
Mb 2.926*** 0.477 2.964*** 0.411 2.852*** 0.537 2.941*** 0.454 2.974*** 0.410 2.874*** 0.554 
Size -0.102 6.642 2.318 4.115 2.600 5.414 0.875 6.536 2.386 4.113 2.171 5.553 
Risk -4.299** 2.013 -3.906** 1.964 -3.555 2.300 -4.291** ` -3.892** 1.963 -3.453 2.317 
cons -59.798 61.016 -4.338 25.111 -74.130 64.913 -46.033 58.870 -3.480 25.065 -82.114 68.507 
Year dummies Yes  
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Industry dummies Yes  
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Number of clustered firms 130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 R2 0.200 
 
0.270 
 
0.095 
 
0.230 
 
0.270 
 
0.070 
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ROE is ratio of net income to total equity; Independ is the percentage of independent directors in the board; Bsize is the board size measured by number of 
directors in the board; Inown is the percentage of institutional ownership; CPS is the CEO pay Slice measured as the percentage of the total compensation of 
top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; ECPS is the equity-based CEO pay Slice measured as the percentage of the total equity-based compensation 
of top-five executives that is captured by the CEO; Cgidum is a dummy variable that takes one for observations with their value of corporate governance 
reporting index above the sample mean, zero otherwise; Interaction is the interaction between CPS and Cgidum; Interaction2 is the interaction between ECPS 
and Cgidum. Bsize
2
 and Inown
2 
are the squares of the board size and percentage of institutional ownership, respectively; Lev is total debt to total asset ratio;  
MB is market to book ratio; Size is natural logarithm of total assets; Risk is measured by firm’s historical beta; Capexp is ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. Some of the R
2 are not reported as the regression doesn’t provide them for the 2SLS system. 
***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Regression results with sub- index related to board, compensation and takeover  
                                                                       (1)                                                (2)                                          (3)                                              (4) 
                                                                  Coef.                       SE                 Coef.                       SE             Coef.                       SE          Coef.                       SE 
Board-sub 0.026** 0.012 0.023* 0.013 0.029* 0.013 0.024* 0.014 
Compensation-sub -0.014 0.011 -0.018* 0.010 -0.012 0.011 -0.014 0.012 
Takeover-sub 0.0001 0.013 0.004 0.010 -0.001 0.015 0.010 0.012 
CEOTen 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.0001 0.002 -0.001 0.003 
CEOChair -0.100 0.064 -0.105* 0.061 -0.096 0.069 -0.097 0.066 
CEOGen -0.049 0.038 -0.063** 0.033 -0.051 0.041 -0.061 0.040 
Inown 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Independ 0.382*** 0.090 0.398*** 0.090 0.394*** 0.097 0.419*** 0.096 
Bsize -0.091*** 0.035 -0.095** 0.037 -0.086** 0.041 -0.093** 0.042 
Bsize
2 
0.003* 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Inown
2
 0.0001*** 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Lev 
0.003 0.092 -0.033 0.084 -0.004 0.103 -0.100 0.132 
MB 
-0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.004 -0.003 0.005 -0.004 0.005 
Tobin 
-0.009 0.015 0.002 0.015 -0.008 0.016 0.011 0.020 
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ROE 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Capexp 
0.024 0.387 0.122 0.362 0.025 0.413 0.343 0.525 
Size 
0.024 0.032 0.042 0.037 0.028 0.035 0.074 0.064 
Risk 
-0.001 0.014 -0.003 0.014 -0.005 0.015 -0.008 0.016 
Cons 
0.656*** 0.252 0.549** 0.278 0.618** 0.283 0.325 0.455 
Year dummies 
        Yes 
 
       No 
 
      Yes 
 
           No  
Industry dummies 
        Yes 
 
      No 
 
      Yes 
 
           No  
Number of clustered firms 
         130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000 
 
130.000  
R
2
 
0.290 
 
0.140 
 
0.330 
 
0.190  
 
Models 1 and 2 have CPS as a dependent variable and Models 3 and 4 use ECPS as dependent variable; board sub is the sub-index for the corporate 
governance index related to the board; compensation Sub is the sub-index for the corporate governance index related to compensation;  takeover sub is the 
sub-index related to takeover; other variables are defined as in table 1.  
***,**,* indicate the coefficient is significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
 
 
